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Abstract 
 
Many people who drink alcohol have experienced a blackout; whereby they 
are unable to recall events that occurred during a period of intoxication. 
Following these blackout episodes, individuals may attempt to reconstruct 
what happened to them. Blackouts therefore afford an excellent opportunity 
to study the strategies people use to reconstruct forgotten experiences. We 
conducted a survey of college students to explore how people choose to 
reconstruct blackouts, and the likely accuracy of these reconstructions. Our 
findings add to the growing research literature on people’s strategies for 
validating their past experiences, and highlight the important role of external 
sources in the reconstruction process. The data show that people’s desire to 
‘fill in the blanks’ can lead them to rely on rather unreliable sources, and may 
also encourage them to adopt weaker source monitoring criteria. Indeed, in at 
least some cases, reconstructing blackouts appears to lead to the development 
of false beliefs or memories.  
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Reconstructing alcohol-induced memory blackouts 
Colleges and universities teem with amnesiacs, of a sort. Around half of 
college students report having experienced alcohol-induced memory 
blackouts; that is, amnesia for periods of time during which they were 
intoxicated (Buelow & Koeppel, 1995; White, Jamieson-Drake, & 
Swartzwelder, 2002). Yet despite the ubiquity of alcohol blackouts, we know 
relatively little about how people who experience blackouts (hereafter, 
blackout sufferers) respond to their memory loss (White, Signer, Kraus, & 
Swartzwelder, 2004). In this paper we ask how—and how accurately—people 
reconstruct what they did during their blackouts. 
Reconstruction strategies 
Research on source monitoring can guide our thinking about how 
people reconstruct and validate past experiences. The Source Monitoring 
Framework (SMF; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) outlines several 
‘internal’ cues that help us to distinguish between experiences that we truly 
remember, and experiences that we only dreamed or imagined. For example, 
genuine memories tend to contain more sensory and contextual details than 
do imagined experiences (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988), and so we 
are more likely to judge mental content to be a genuine memory if it has these 
memory-like characteristics. What happens, though, if during reconstruction 
a person has few if any candidate memories to assess, as in the case of 
blackouts? One particular model derived from SMF research argues that 
people engage in a series of reasoned decisions to judge whether a suggested 
experience occurred (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002). When the suggested 
experience cannot be recalled, the person must first assess whether they 
should expect to recall it, if it had occurred. If so, then the suggestion can be 
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rejected. But if the person believes they might not recall an experience even if 
it had occurred, then she will next attempt to verify the experience by 
accumulating information to determine the likelihood that it did occur. This 
likelihood is compared against an implicit criterion; the suggestion is only 
accepted if the apparent likelihood exceeds that criterion. 
Like Mazzoni and Kirsch’s (2002) model, the SMF holds that people are 
often motivated to engage in effortful, systematic verification strategies to 
reconstruct the past. However, in contrast to heuristic strategies based on 
evaluating memory characteristics, these effortful strategies have received 
relatively little attention in the source monitoring literature. As an exception, 
there is a small body of research focusing on how people verify whether their 
memories are veridical (Ross, 1997). Wade and Garry (2005), for instance, 
asked people how they would determine whether particular childhood 
experiences really occurred if somebody cast their memories into doubt. Their 
study illustrated that people frequently consult external sources of 
information to this end: they ask other people or, sometimes, search for 
physical evidence such as photographs or written documents. In a similar 
vein, when Mazzoni, Scoboria, and Harvey (2010) asked subjects why they no 
longer believed in specific childhood events, the most common reason was 
that the subjects had received disconfirming evidence from another person 
such as a parent. 
So why study the reconstruction of alcohol blackouts? One reason is that 
whereas researchers such as Wade and Garry (2005) have looked at strategies 
for verifying memories, no study has examined the strategies people use to 
determine what they did when they have no memory for a period of time 
(although we can learn from clinical cases; see Bryant, 1996; Harvey & Bryant, 
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2001). Theoretical accounts such as that of Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) imply 
that searching for external evidence is less likely to happen when people can 
accept or reject a suggestion on the basis of having a specific memory. 
Therefore, studying amnesia could augment our understanding of the 
effortful side of source monitoring. Because blackouts are common 
experiences (White et al., 2002), they afford the opportunity to study these 
amnesia reconstruction processes on a large scale without relying on 
observations from individual clinical cases. 
Accuracy of reconstructions 
One aim of the present study was to gauge the likelihood that blackout 
reconstructions will be prone to distortion. When people are exposed to 
incorrect information about their experiences, they can develop false beliefs 
and even false memories (Garry & Wade, 2005; Loftus, 2005; Nash, Wade, & 
Brewer, 2009). Moreover, these beliefs and memories can have behavioral 
consequences (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Wade, Green, 
& Nash, 2010). In the case of blackouts, such errors could have an enormous 
impact, not least because during blackouts people engage in (and expect to 
engage in) risky behaviors such as drug use, fighting, and sexual intercourse 
(White et al., 2004). 
Observations from survey studies investigating students’ drinking 
experiences suggest that the accuracy of reconstructions may indeed be a 
concern. White et al. (2004), for instance, surveyed undergraduates who had 
experienced blackouts, and found that almost all (94%) had on at least one 
occasion been told what happened by a friend. Furthermore, in 83% of these 
cases the informant friend had also been intoxicated during the events they 
described. Given alcohol’s capacity to impair memory (e.g., Milani & Curran, 
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2000; Yuille & Tollestrup, 1990), White et al.’s findings raise doubts over the 
accuracy of blackout reconstructions, as do those of Giles (1999), who found 
that drinkers in groups often embellish and fabricate their reconstructions. 
Based on the diverse research we have discussed, we were interested 
here in assessing [1] the strategies people use to reconstruct alcohol-induced 
blackouts; [2] whether blackout sufferers might be exposed to incorrect 
information as a result of trying to reconstruct their experiences; and [3] 
whether such information ever results in false beliefs or memories. To this 
end, we surveyed college students about their experiences of—and beliefs 
about—reconstructing blackouts. 
Method 
Subjects 
Two hundred and eighty students (78.2% female; M= 22.2 years, SD= 
5.10, Range= 18-47) voluntarily completed an Internet survey investigating 
students’ experiences of the effects of alcohol on memory. Subjects were 
invited to participate regardless of whether they drink alcohol. 
Materials and Procedure 
Before completing the survey, subjects provided demographic 
information (gender; age) and details about their usual drinking habits 
(whether they drink alcohol; how many units of alcohol they drink in the 
average week1). 
                                                
1 One unit was defined as roughly equivalent to: half a pint of regular-strength beer 
or cider; 1 small glass of wine; 1 pub measure of spirit; or half a 400ml bottle of 
'alcopop'. 
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Section 1 
The first section of the survey assessed subjects’ evaluations of different 
strategies for reconstructing blackouts. We told subjects to imagine they went 
to a party and drank a lot of alcohol, but the next morning they remembered 
nothing that happened after arriving. We then asked subjects how motivated 
they would be to find out what happened at the party (1= Not at all 
motivated; 5= Extremely motivated), and how motivated they would be to 
use each of eight strategies (listed in Figure 1) to this end. These eight 
strategies were adapted from Wade and Garry (2005), who classified subjects’ 
freely-reported strategy suggestions into five categories. Finally in this 
section, our subjects rated how reliable they thought each strategy would be 
for obtaining accurate information (1= Not at all reliable; 5= Extremely 
reliable). 
Section 2 
The second section asked subjects about their experience of helping 
others to reconstruct blackouts. We asked whether any of the following 
statements were true of at least one such occasion: [1] “some of the details 
may have been unintentionally inaccurate”; [2] “I made up some of the 
details”; [3] “I gave the other person an entirely made-up account of what 
they did.” Where applicable, subjects were asked to describe what they had 
told the blackout sufferer, and the reasons for their possible inaccuracies. 
Section 3 
Section 3 asked about subjects’ experiences of reconstructing their own 
blackouts. Subjects first reported whether they had ever experienced a partial 
or total blackout, defined as follows: 
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Sometimes people forget certain periods of time from after the onset of 
the blackout, but remember other periods without needing to find 
evidence or be reminded. We refer to these experiences as PARTIAL 
blackouts. Sometimes people remember nothing at all from the onset of 
the blackout until much later or, more usually, when they awake the 
following day. We refer to these experiences as TOTAL blackouts. 
 
Subjects chose from four options: [1] I have experienced a total blackout 
(This option also applied to respondents who had experienced both total and 
partial blackouts); [2] I have experienced a partial blackout, but I have never 
had a total blackout; [3] Neither, or [4] Not sure. Subjects who selected ‘Total’ 
or ‘Partial’ were asked to select which if any external source-types 
(intoxicated people; non-intoxicated people; photos/videos; other physical 
evidence) they had relied on to reconstruct real blackouts. Finally, they were 
asked whether they had ever learnt that they did something during a 
blackout, only to later discover it never really happened. Subjects who 
responded ‘yes’ reported whether they had believed the false event occurred 
(1= Not at all; 5= I was convinced that it happened), and seemed to remember 
it happening (1= Not at all; 5= I had what seemed to be a clear and detailed 
memory).  
Results 
How common are alcohol-induced memory blackouts? 
Before addressing our research questions, we established the incidence 
of blackout experiences in our sample. Eighty-five percent of subjects were 
self-reported drinkers, of whom 61.2% reported having experienced a total 
(24.5%) or partial (but not total; 36.7%) blackout. Male drinkers were more 
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likely than female drinkers to have experienced a blackout [75.4% vs. 56.7%, 
χ2(1, N= 237)= 6.42, p= .01, φ= .17]. Unsurprisingly, drinkers with experience 
of total blackouts reported the heaviest alcohol consumption (M= 11.86 
units/week), compared to drinkers with experience of partial blackouts only 
(M= 7.34), and drinkers with no experience of blackouts or who were unsure 
(M= 3.82), H(2, N= 237)= 34.60, p < .001. 
Together, these results replicate those of previous studies by showing 
that forgetting intoxicated experiences is common among student drinkers, 
especially the heaviest drinkers. The alcohol-induced blackout is therefore an 
excellent vehicle for studying autobiographical reconstruction processes. 
Given this evidence of memories lost, we were next interested in how people 
seek to ‘fill in’ their memory blanks. 
Strategies for reconstructing blackouts 
Recall that we asked how motivated subjects would be to find out what 
they did during a hypothetical blackout. Overall, subjects said they would be 
highly motivated (M= 4.40, SD= 0.80): the modal response, representing 52% 
of the sample, was 5 (‘extremely motivated’). Just one subject—a non-
drinker—claimed they would be ‘not at all motivated’ to reconstruct a 
blackout. 
The darker bars in Figure 1 display subjects’ motivation to use the 
reconstruction strategies we asked about. In the context of our hypothetical 
party example, subjects said they would be most motivated to ask a friend 
who had been at the party but had not been intoxicated. They were also 
inclined to try to remember by thinking hard, and to look for photographic or 
video evidence. Subjects were rather less motivated to ask party guests who 
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were not their friends (hereafter, non-friends), or to try to recall more by 
returning to the party location. 
Next, we examined the degree to which subjects judged each strategy as 
reliable. The lighter bars in Figure 1 display these data. As well as being the 
strategy that subjects were most motivated to use, asking a friend who had 
not been intoxicated was also deemed the most reliable strategy. Looking for 
photographic, video or physical evidence, or asking non-friends who had not 
been intoxicated, were also judged as reliable strategies. The remaining four 
strategies were judged as unreliable (i.e., M< 3); two of these strategies 
involved intoxicated ‘witnesses,’ and interestingly, subjects believed that 
trying to remember by thinking hard might also be unreliable.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
There were several differences between the ratings of drinkers who had 
experienced blackouts and those who had not. Specifically, blackout sufferers 
were relatively more motivated to rely on friends who had been intoxicated 
[M= 3.57 vs. 3.12, t(235)= 3.05, p< .01, d= 0.40]; whereas drinkers with no 
experience of blackouts were more motivated to return to the party’s location 
[M= 1.59 vs. 2.09, t(164.10)= 3.51, p< .01, d= 0.48] or to rely on non-friends who 
had not been intoxicated [M= 2.08 vs. 2.55, t(235)= 3.19, p< .01, d= 0.43]. 
Blackout sufferers perceived asking non-friends who had been intoxicated as 
more reliable than did drinkers with no experience of blackouts (M= 2.09 vs. 
1.71, t(222.88)= 3.17, p< .01, d= 0.41. The same was true of intoxicated friends, 
although this difference was not statistically significant after a Bonferroni 
correction [M= 2.68 vs. 2.40, t(235)= 2.30, p= .02, d= 0.30]. 
Our data thus far tell us about subjects’ beliefs regarding blackout 
reconstruction strategies. But which strategies had subjects actually used? 
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When blackout sufferers (n= 148) reported the external sources they had 
consulted to reconstruct real blackouts, we observed that consulting 
intoxicated people was somewhat more common (77.0%) than was consulting 
non-intoxicated people (69.6%; z= 1.45, p= .15). Interestingly, 43.9% said that 
on at least one occasion they had seen a photograph or video-recording of 
what happened, and 20.9% had found other physical evidence. These 
retrospective reports broadly mapped onto subjects’ prospective reports: 
blackout subjects who had relied on intoxicated people in the past were also 
more motivated to rely on intoxicated friends (p< .001) and non-friends (p= 
.03) in the future, compared to those who had never relied on such sources. 
People who had relied on photo/video evidence (p< .001), and other physical 
evidence (p= .02) were also more motivated to rely on those sources in future. 
Accuracy of reconstructing blackouts 
We next explored the accuracy of blackout reconstruction strategies. To 
assess potential inaccuracies, subjects were asked about their experience of 
finding inaccuracies in their blackout reconstructions, and of being an 
‘informant’ for other drinkers.  
Contamination of own reconstructions  
We asked the 148 blackout subjects whether they had ever been told—or 
otherwise found out—that they did something during a blackout, only to later 
discover that what they supposedly did never really happened. Twenty-five 
(16.9%) subjects responded ‘yes.’ Seventeen of these students specifically 
reported that the source of this incorrect information was a friend. When we 
asked what caused the information to be incorrect, the most frequent reason 
was that the source had been intoxicated. Indeed, one striking finding was 
that blackout subjects who had relied on intoxicated people for information in 
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the past—compared to those who had not—were [1] more likely to report 
having been exposed to misinformation, χ2(1, N= 148)= 3.81, p= .05, φ= .16; 
and yet [2] more confident in the reliability of intoxicated friends and non-
friends (both ps < .01). In other words, these subjects had more faith in 
intoxicated sources even though they were more likely to have been misled 
by such people. 
When asked how they discovered that the event did not happen, 
subjects’ most frequent response was that other people who were present—
particularly people who were sober—had informed them. In some cases, the 
inaccurate source remembered what ‘really’ happened, or admitted to lying. 
Interestingly, experiences of being exposed to misinformation seemed to 
influence people’s strategy preferences for reconstructing future blackouts. As 
compared to the remaining 123 blackout subjects, the 25 subjects who knew 
they had been exposed to misinformation reported being more motivated to 
look for photographs or videos [M= 4.36 vs. M= 3.67, t(48.52)= 3.55, p< .01, d= 
0.67] and other physical evidence [M= 4.00 vs. M= 3.32, t(146)= 2.77, p< .01, d= 
0.63].2 
Whilst reconstructing blackouts, then, students are sometimes exposed 
to incorrect information about what occurred. The 25 subjects who reported 
having been exposed to misinformation rated their belief in and memory of 
the fabricated event(s). Seventeen subjects (11.5% of blackout sufferers) 
reported having been confident that a false event had occurred, assigning a 
belief rating above 3. Moreover, 5 subjects (3.4%) reported having experienced 
memories of a false event, assigning a memory rating above 3. Because we 
                                                
2 Note that subjects gave their ‘motivation’ ratings before being asked about their 
experiences of exposure to false information. 
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only assessed circumstances in which people had come to realise that the 
information they acquired was incorrect, these data likely underestimate how 
often blackout sufferers are exposed to incorrect information, and how often 
reconstructions promote false beliefs or memories. To gain an additional 
estimate of how often blackout sufferers receive false information, we 
examined people’s experiences of verifying others’ blackouts. 
Contamination of others’ reconstructions 
The majority of our 280 subjects (70.4%) said they had been consulted for 
information to help someone reconstruct a blackout. Even after removing 
non-drinkers from analyses, these informants tended to drink more (M= 8.02 
units/week) than did non-informants (M= 4.25), t(180.54)= 3.82, p< .001, d= 
0.49, and were more likely to have experienced a blackout themselves, χ2(1, 
N= 237)= 18.88, p< .001, φ= .28. This finding fits with the notion that heavy 
drinkers tend to associate with other heavy drinkers, and reconstruct each 
other’s blackouts as a social activity (Giles, 1999). 
The majority of informants (75.6%) admitted that they might have 
unintentionally provided inaccurate details about somebody else’s blackout. 
Unfortunately, we did not assess how often these admittances were based on 
knowledge that errors were made, rather than acknowledgements of the 
fallibility of memory. However, many informants reported specific 
information they had told another person, which they suspected or knew to 
be incorrect. Examples included claiming that the person had kissed someone 
undesirable, vomited on another person, or exposed themselves. 
Some informants admitted that they had deliberately made up details 
(13.7%) or even made up an entire event (7.1%). Again, many of these made-
up incidents involved romantic or sexual encounters with undesirable others.
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Subjects provided several reasons why they had or might have provided 
inaccurate information, such as straight-out lying (“I was lying”); second-
hand information (“only heard it from someone else”); taking advantage of 
the situation (“I just wanted to scare her”); or simply getting the details 
wrong (“I couldn’t see them very well, they could have just been hugging”).  
Given the high rate of informants either knowing or suspecting that they 
provided false information about someone else’s blackout, these results point 
to a possible “dark figure” of errors. Moreover, even the data from informants 
may underestimate how often false information is provided, not least because 
informants are frequently intoxicated during the events they are later asked 
about. 
Discussion 
People often feel embarrassed or scared when they learn how they 
behaved during an alcohol-induced blackout (White et al., 2004). Nonetheless, 
it is clear that blackout sufferers are still highly motivated to reconstruct their 
amnesic episodes. Our findings add to the small research literature on 
memory validation (e.g., Mazzoni et al., 2010; Ross, 1997; Wade & Garry, 
2005) by providing insights into how people reconstruct autobiographical 
narratives when they have no memories to evaluate. As such, these data 
extend our knowledge of the effortful aspects of source monitoring that have 
received scant attention from researchers. Although our retrospective data 
rely on self-reports, and so are vulnerable to recollection biases and errors, 
they suggest that when people reconstruct forgotten recent episodes—just 
like when verifying childhood memories—they tend to rely on rather 
unreliable information sources. 
Reconstruction strategies 
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As in previous studies, our subjects reported a heavy reliance on other 
people, particularly friends, as a source of information (Wade & Garry, 2005; 
White et al., 2004). Although our subjects believed that witnesses would be 
more reliable sources if they had been sober at the time of the blackout, 
intoxicated sources were in fact more regularly relied upon than were sober 
sources, perhaps because obtaining reliable information can involve greater 
effort.  
Nevertheless, people do not rely solely on others when they have no 
memory: Our subjects reported being motivated to search for photographic or 
other physical evidence of what happened, and over half reported that such 
evidence had helped them to reconstruct real blackouts in the past. 
Interestingly, the subjects who reported the greatest motivation to look for 
physical evidence were those who knew they had received misinformation 
about their blackouts in the past. Nearly one in five of our blackout sufferer 
subjects were aware that they had been misled during past reconstructions 
and, correspondingly, a substantial proportion of ‘informants’ knew or 
suspected that they had provided false information. These findings lead us to 
expect that blackout sufferers’ reconstructions are frequently erroneous.  
One interesting finding was that blackout sufferers—as compared to 
drinkers who had never experienced a blackout—placed significantly more 
confidence in the reliability of intoxicated people, and said they would be 
more motivated to obtain information from them. One interpretation of this 
finding is that the blackout subjects had often relied on intoxicated sources in 
the past, and contrary to expectation had found them to be helpful and 
reliable. This interpretation, though, is inconsistent with our finding that 
those subjects who had relied on intoxicated sources were actually more likely 
 16 
to have been exposed to misinformation. An alternative explanation, then, is 
that in the course of reconstructing blackouts, these previously-intoxicated 
people might often be the only source of evidence available. Because people 
are highly motivated to reconstruct forgotten experiences, it is possible that 
such circumstances might encourage individuals to believe that the available 
sources of evidence are more reliable. This interpretation is consistent with 
Mazzoni and Kirsch’s (2002) model. Recall that the model assumes that 
people will believe in non-remembered events if the events seem likely 
enough to have happened. Importantly, though, the model also holds that 
this “likely enough” criterion is raised or lowered to suit the circumstances. 
People might well lower their belief criterion when they are highly motivated 
to reconstruct events but the only available evidence is unreliable. Future 
research should test this hypothesis, which is also consistent with the SMF 
tenet that criterion-setting is influenced by one’s goals and motivations 
(Johnson et al., 1993).  
Believing and remembering 
Our results add to existing research showing how beliefs and memories 
can be constructed using external information. Being exposed to inaccurate 
external evidence, though, can lead people to believe in and remember 
experiences that never occurred (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009; Loftus, 2005; Nash 
et al., 2009), and Mazzoni and Kirsch’s (2002) model leads us to expect that 
blackout sufferers would be especially susceptible to such effects. As we have 
outlined, the model posits that people can often reject suggestions about their 
experiences by reasoning “I’d remember that, if it happened”. Unlike people 
with intact memory though, blackout sufferers have no such way of assessing 
how ‘diagnostic’ their lack of a specific memory is. Thus, at this stage in the 
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reasoning process the blackout sufferer cannot rule out suggestions—even 
those about experiences that should be highly memorable—and must 
therefore collect and rely on external information. According to the Mazzoni 
and Kirsch model, if the information gathered is false, then the only 
remaining way to avoid a false belief is to set a high belief criterion. Yet, as we 
have speculated, our data seem instead to suggest that blackout sufferers 
might be inclined to adopt low criteria. In sum, then, it seems that the nature 
of blackouts can preclude sufferers from using most of the metacognitive 
toolkit that typically enables us to resist false beliefs and memories. With 
people’s proclivity to rely on unreliable evidence sources, reconstructing 
blackouts might often cultivate errors. 
 Indeed, a small proportion of our subjects said that they had believed 
some false information they learned while reconstructing a blackout. A 
smaller proportion said they had experienced this belief as a memory. The 
occurrence of these false beliefs and memories is important because 
autobiography has self-fulfilling effects on attitudes and behavior: people 
infer how they will behave in the future by considering how they behaved in 
the past (Ross & Buehler, 2004; Wilson & Ross, 2003). We can only speculate 
about the consequences that blackout sufferers’ false beliefs and memories 
could in some cases have. For instance, archival studies suggest that 
numerous innocent people have confessed to crimes after being led to believe 
they committed the acts whilst drunk (Gudjonsson, 2003; Leo, 2008), and 
flawed reconstructions might also lead blackout sufferers to make false 
accusations against others (Davis & Loftus, 2004). The misinformation our 
subjects were aware of receiving—and that informants were aware of 
providing—rarely concerned criminal acts, but it did frequently concern 
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unwanted and embarrassing acts such as having sexual encounters with 
strangers. In the least, we can say that learning (correctly or incorrectly) that 
one engaged in these types of behavior during a forgotten time-period could 
plausibly have emotional, psychological, and social repercussions. 
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Figure 1. Mean motivation and reliability ratings assigned to specific blackout 
reconstruction strategies, ±1SE. 
